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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County. The appeal has been transferred to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
Did the Court abuse its discretion and commit reversible error in denying Ereren's 
Motion to Compel answers to certain interrogatories and document requests to which 
Snowbird objected as unduly burdensome, overly broad and not reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's denial of Ereren's Motion to Compel may 
not be reversed unless Ereren establishes that the court's ruling was a clear abuse of 
discretion. Pack v. Case. 2001 UT App. 232,1116, 30 P.3d 436; Archuleta v. Hughes. 969 
P.2d 409, 414 (Utah 1998). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable 
basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). A 
trial court's ruling will be overturned only if it "is so unreasonable that it can be classified as 
arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion.35 Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 
275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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ISSUE II 
Has Ereren failed to demonstrate that Judge Livingston abused his discretion in 
admitting under Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, conflicting financial statements relevant 
to refute Erereifs claims that he had a thriving medical practice until his alleged ski injury? 
Standard of Review. A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable 
basis for the decision.55 Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). A 
trial court's ruling will be overturned only if it "is so unreasonable that it can be classified as 
arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion.55 Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 
275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
ISSUE III 
Has Ereren failed to demonstrate that Judge Livingston's admission of Ereren5s 
conflicting financial statements was harmful? 
Standard of Review. If Ereren were able establish a clear abuse of discretion on 
this evidentiary issue, he would still required to establish that the Court's ruling was 
"harmful.55 Tones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp.. 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). 
"Harmful error occurs where the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the 
error is sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict.55 Id 
ISSUE IV 
Has Ereren failed to demonstrate that Judge Livingston abused his discretion in 
admitting under Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of Ereren5s loss through 
gambling of funds loaned by Johnson & Johnson for use in his medical practice as being 
relevant to his claims that he had a thriving medical practice until his alleged ski injury? 
Standard of Review. A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable 
basis for the decision.53 Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). A 
trial court's ruling will be overturned only if it "is so unreasonable that it can be classified as 
arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion." Kunzler v. Q5Dell? 855 P.2d 270, 
275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
ISSUE V 
Has Ereren failed to demonstrate that Judge Livingston's admission of evidence of 
Ereren's gambling was harmful? 
Standard of Review. If Ereren were able establish a clear abuse of discretion on 
this evidentiary issue he would still required to establish that the Court's ruling was 
"harmful.55 Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp.. 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). 
"Harmful error occurs where the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the 
error is sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict.55 I d 
ISSUE VI 
Has Ereren failed to demonstrate that Judge Livingston abused his discretion in 
admitting under Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of Ereren's bankruptcy filing 
relevant to his claims that he had a thriving medical practice until his alleged ski injury? 
Standard of Review. A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable 
basis for the decision.55 Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). A 
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trial court's ruling will be overturned only if it "is so unreasonable that it can be classified as 
arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion." Kunzler v. O'DelL 855 P.2d 270, 
275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
ISSUE VII 
Has Ereren failed to demonstrate that Judge Livingston's admission of evidence of 
Ereren's bankruptcy filing was harmful? 
Standard of Review. If Ereren were able to establish a clear abuse of discretion on 
this evidentiary issue, he would still be required to establish that the Court's ruling was 
"harmful." Tones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). 
"Harmful error occurs where the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the 
error is sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict." IdL 
ISSUE VIII 
Did Judge Livingston properly exercise his discretion in precluding plaintiff Ereren 
from calling a surprise "rebuttal" witness, a lawyer friend of Ereren's counsel, first disclosed 
midway through trial, to purportedly testify regarding an issue that Ereren had explored 
during discovery: the alleged frequent incidence of jumping in the area of the alleged 
accident? 
Standard of Review. Judge Livingston's ruling on this issue may not be reversed, 
unless appellant Ereren demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion by the judge. Turner v. 
Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1994). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is 
"no reasonable basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 
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(Utah 1993). A trial court's ruling will be overturned only if it "is so unreasonable that it 
can be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion.53 Kunzler v. 
O'DelL 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
The following Utah Rules of Evidence are determinative of many of the issues 
presented on this appeal. There are no statutes or regulations pertinent to the issues on 
appeal. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence.53 
"Relevant evidence" means any evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of any consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would otherwise be without the evidence. 
UtahR. Evid. 401. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence 
inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of 
the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible. 
Utah R. Evid. 402 
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Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. 
This is a personal injury action. Plaintiff Ereren claimed he was injured while in a 
beginners ski school class at Snowbird in March of 1995. Ereren alleged that a Snowbird 
ski instructor negligently caused him to be positioned in a dangerous location on an expert 
ski run and that a phantom airborne snowboarder landed on his head. He claimed millions 
of dollars in lost income resulting from this alleged ski accident. 
Ereren was unable to identify the location of the accident, the ski instructor, any 
witnesses, or any documentation of the alleged accident. Indeed, Ereren changed his sworn 
deposition testimony and the alleged location of the collision shortly before trial. (R. at 
1415, pp. 40-42; R. at 717-720.) Despite Snowbird's identification of all ski instructors 
who taught on the alleged day of the collision, Ereren testified that none of these 
instructors taught his class. Snowbird had no record of the alleged accident and maintained 
that no such accident ever occurred. 
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After a four-day jury trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that Ereren 
failed to prove that the alleged accident ever occurred. Ereren now appeals from that 
verdict and the trial court's denial of his Motion for New Trial. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Ereren is a general surgeon who lives and works in southern 
California. (R. at 1415, pp. 7, 9.) 
2. On December 9, 1998, Ereren commenced this negligence action to 
recover for personal injury he claims he sustained while in a ski school class at 
Snowbird Ski Resort more than three and a half years earlier. In his Complaint, he 
claimed the accident occurred on March 8, 1995. (R. at 1-6.) 
3. Snowbird had no record of Ereren's alleged accident. (R. at 1415, 
pp. 52-53.) 
4. Snowbird conducted discovery, including interrogatories, document 
requests and depositions, in an attempt to determine the specifics of the alleged 
accident. (R. at 13, 44-45, 152, 189-190, 221, 485-487, 1415.) 
5. Ereren claimed that a Snowbird ski instructor negligently placed him 
in a blind spot on a ski run, causing him to be hit in the head and neck by a phantom 
airborne snowboarder. (R. at 2-3.) 
6. Ereren, however, could not identify a single witness to the accident 
other than himself and another student in his ski class, allegedly a physician from 
Florida with a first name of "Scott." (R. at 1415, pp. 34-36.) 
7. Erereifs story, however, continuously changed. First Ereren claimed 
the accident occurred on March 8, 1995. (R. at 1-6.) Then he claimed it occurred 
on March 9, 1995. (R. at 1415, pp. 27-28.) 
8. Ereren testified in his deposition that the accident occurred on a ski 
run called Chip's Face. (R. at 1415, p. 36.) 
9. Later, after Snowbird witnesses had testified that such an accident 
could not possibly have occurred on Chip's Face, Ereren changed his testimony to 
claim that the accident occurred in an entirely different location on the ski mountain. 
(R. at 717-720.) 
10. Ereren testified that he was a beginning skier, having skied only three 
or four days in his life, and that he skied with the same blonde female ski instructor 
two days in a row, during his March 1995 trip to Snowbird. (R. at 1415, pp. 27-
28.) 
11. From Erereifs description of instructor, the size of his class and his 
siding ability, Snowbird was able to use ski school records to narrow the possibilities 
to two blonde female instructors who taught on March 9, 1995. (R. at 1412, 
p. 388.) 
12. The only two possible ski instructors were produced for depositions. 
After they each gave credible testimony that no such ski accident ever occurred in 
one of their ski classes (R. at 1418, p. 67; R. at 1419, pp. 38-39, 43), Ereren 
claimed that neither of these instructors was the one who taught his class. (R. at 
1413, pp. 488.) 
13. While Ereren claimed that he thought the ski instructor had a first or 
last name of Laura, Lori or Lauren, Snowbird had no ski instructor by any of those 
names teaching adult classes during the 1994-1995 season. And no instructor by 
any of those names taught adult ski lessons at Snowbird on March 9, 1995. (R. at 
1412, p. 372; R. at 1417, pp. 22-23.) 
14. Snowbird produced every record in its possession with Ereren's name 
on it, and every record in its possession relating to ski school classes on March 8 
and 9, 1995. (R. at 1411, p. 213; R. at 1412, p. 364.) 
15. When Snowbird produced the lesson logs for the dates at issue 
showing the names of the only two possible ski instructors matching Ereren's 
description, Ereren argued that the records were false or incomplete. (R. at 1417, 
p. 24.) 
16. Snowbird produced two ski instructors, the Director of Mountain 
Operations, the Ski School Director, and the Director of Mountain Development for 
depositions. (R. at 1418, 1419, 1416, 1417 and 175-176.) 
17. Ereren served written discovery on Snowbird demanding that 
Snowbird provide detailed information on all of the 230 ski instructors it employed 
in March of 1995 (R. at 55) and that it comb all of its lodging records for a ten-day 
period in March 1995 to find any records of guests from Florida or physician guests. 
(R. at 61.) 
18. When Snowbird objected to Ereren's discovery on the grounds that it 
was overly broad, unduly burdensome and might invade the privacy of guests, 
Ereren filed a Motion to Compel. (R. at 52-67.) After briefing, the Court agreed 
with Snowbird and denied Ereren's Motion. (R. at 156-157.) 
19. Ereren claimed he had a thriving medical practice until his alleged 
siding accident and resulting neck injury. He claimed Snowbird was liable for 
millions of dollars in lost past and projected future income from his medical practice. 
(R. at 1413, p. 699.) 
20. Snowbird discovered, however, that Ereren's medical practice was in a 
steep decline well before the date of Erereifs alleged ski injury. (R. at 1414, pp. 
754-755.) In fact, Ereren had borrowed $1 million dollars for expansion of his 
medical practice, but rather than use the money for his business, he withdrew it all to 
use for personal expenses. (R. at 1414, p. 754.) The amount of money borrowed 
coincides with the amount of money gambled and lost by Ereren after the loans were 
made. (R. at 1413, pp. 526-530.) Ereren had two sets of financial statements, one 
of which he used to obtain loans for his practice, and the other which was for 
internal use only, reflecting the true and much lower value of his practice. (R. at 
1414, pp. 748-753.) In addition, Ereren had filed a prior lawsuit in 1994 against a 
California hospital. (R. at 1413, pp. 534-536.) He alleged that the hospital had 
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caused his referrals to drop by 40 percent and had caused him emotional distress, 
neck pain and headaches, affecting his ability to perform surgery. (R. at 1413, 
pp. 537, 541, 544, 547, 548.) 
21. Ereren, of course, did not want the jury to hear the full story of the 
reasons for his declining medical practice, and he filed motions in limine prior to 
trial to preclude evidence of his gambling losses, bankruptcy and conflicting financial 
records. (R. at 973-975.) 
22. Judge Livingston heard extensive argument on the motions in limine 
and determined to allow the evidence in under Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
for its relevance to Erereifs damage claims. (R. at 1410, pp. 1-123; R. at 1411, 
p. 10.) 
23. At Ereren's request, the Court assured through jury voir dire, that 
none of the jurors seated on the jury had any bias toward persons who engaged in 
gambling or filed bankruptcy. (R. at 1411, pp. 123-127.) 
24. At trial, the jury heard credible testimony from Snowbird witnesses 
who denied that an accident such as described by Ereren ever happened. (R. at 
1411, pp. 261-262; R. at 1412, pp. 322-323; R. at 1412, p. 333, 343-344, 355; 
R. at 1412, p. 377, 396.) 
25. Ereren attempted to bring in an undisclosed lay witness halfway 
through trial, allegedly to testify that he had seen people jump in the area of the 
alleged accident, and to "rebut35 "surprise35 testimony of Snowbird witnesses, to the 
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effect that the area was not known as a site for frequent jumping. (R. at 1412, pp. 
404-405, 407.) The testimony of the Snowbird witnesses was not surprise 
testimony. In fact, it was entirely consistent with prior deposition testimony by the 
same witnesses, and certainly should have been anticipated by Ereren. (R. at 1416, 
p. 89; R. at 1417, p. 59; R. at 1419, pp. 45-46; R. at 1418, pp. 54-55.) Judge 
Livingston precluded Ereren's undisclosed "rebuttal" witness from testifying. (R. at 
1412, pp. 412-413.) 
26. After due deliberation, the jury returned a special verdict, finding that 
Ereren failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that the accident he described 
even occurred. (R. at 1257-1259.) 
27. Ereren filed a Motion for New Trial. (R. at 1278-1279.) After 
briefing, Judge Livingston denied Erereifs Motion. (R. at 1384-1385.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Erkan Ereren filed this claim in December 1998 for injuries he allegedly 
incurred in a ski accident in March 1995. Snowbird was unaware of any such accident and 
Ereren refused to specify the date of the accident, the identities of any witnesses or even the 
location of the alleged accident. As discovery proceeded, Ereren changed the alleged date of 
the accident, and the location of the accident. When Snowbird produced the only ski 
instructors who could match Ereren's descriptions, Ereren denied either of these ski 
instructors taught his class, apparendy because their testimony regarding the impossibility 
of the accident was too credible. 
Ereren fails to meet his burden of establishing that the trial court abused it discretion 
in denying his Motion to Compel Discovery. The interrogatories and document requests at 
issue were clearly overly broad and unduly burdensome. Snowbird, moreover, produced 
every document in its possession containing the name "Ereren35 and all documents regarding 
the ski school classes from the two different days Ereren alleged the accident occurred. 
Ereren also had the opportunity to depose Snowbird management personnel and the only 
two blonde, female ski instructors (as described by Ereren) who taught the level of ski class 
matching his ability on the dates he identified. The denial of Ereren's Motion to Compel 
was not arbitrary and capricious, and clearly was within the Court's sound discretion. 
Ereren claimed that he had a lucrative and successful private medical practice until it 
was destroyed by the neck injury he allegedly received in the ski accident. Accordingly, it 
was well within the Court's discretion to allow Snowbird to present evidence that Ereren's 
practice was in fact spiraling downward even prior to the date of the alleged accident due to 
Erereifs poor business management, which included obtaining large practice loans, and 
then gambling away the loan proceeds in Las Vegas. The conflicting financial statements 
and bankruptcy filing all evidenced the fact that Ereren's business was failing for other 
reasons long before the alleged ski accident. 
Ereren also fails to demonstrate that the evidence Snowbird introduced to refute his 
damage claims had any prejudicial effect on the jury's special verdict finding that Ereren 
failed to prove the alleged accident ever occurred. Although Ereren fails to marshal any 
evidence to support his argument, even a cursory review of the evidence shows Ereren 
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repeatedly changed his testimony regarding the most basic facts of the alleged accident, lied 
about not having made other previous claims of neck pain, and lied about the causes of 
damage to his medical practice. Snowbird ski instructors, moreover, gave credible 
testimony that the accident described by Ereren did not happen. Thus, the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict was overwhelming, regardless of the damage evidence relating 
to Erereifs gambling losses, financial statement and bankruptcy. 
At Erereifs request, the Court further assured that there would be no prejudicial 
effect from the gambling and bankruptcy evidence by questioning all of the prospective 
jurors about these topics. Ereren was allowed to exclude for cause any of the jurors who 
would have been biased by such evidence. Because Ereren fails to establish both a clear 
abuse of discretion and harm, the trial court's rulings on the damage evidence must be 
affirmed. 
Finally, Ereren fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Ereren's request during trial to present a previously undisclosed lay witness to offer 
opinion testimony about whether the area where the accident allegedly occurred was where 
he had observed ski jumping on occasion. Ereren proffered this testimony to "rebut35 
"surprise" testimony from Snowbird witnesses that the area of the alleged accident was not 
laiown for frequent jumping. The record, however, clearly shows that the issue of whether 
this area was a dangerous jumping location was raised in Ereren5s own Amended 
Complaint, early in the litigation, and the Snowbird witnesses3 testimony was not "surprise35 
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testimony. They testified consistently with their prior deposition testimony. Ereren 
reasonably should have anticipated this testimony at trial. 
Because Ereren fails to demonstrate any clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, 
his request on appeal for a new trial must be denied, and the jury's verdict affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF EREREN'S MOTION TO COMPEL 
WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION AND PROVIDES NO BASIS 
FOR OVERTURNING THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
It is well established that a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel is reviewed on 
appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 414 
(Utah 1998). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no reasonable basis for the 
decision.55 Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.? 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). A trial court's 
ruling will be overturned only if it "is so unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary 
and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion.55 Kunzler v. Q5DelL 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). Ereren, as appellant, falls far short of demonstrating an abuse of discretion 
in the trial court's denial of his Motion to Compel. 
The issue presented here is very similar to the denial of a motion to compel reviewed 
by the Court of Appeals in Pack v. Case. 2001 UT App. 232, 30 P. 3d 436, which involved 
breach of contractual warranty on roofing work. The defendant had served interrogatories 
requesting identification of all persons who had worked at the subject house. The plaintiff 
objected on the grounds that the interrogatories were overly broad and unduly burdensome. 
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The trial court agreed and denied defendant's Motion to Compel. Defendant lost at trial 
and appealed on several issues, including the denial of the Motion to Compel. 
The Court of Appeals first noted that whether the trial court had abused its 
discretion in denying the Motion to Compel did not matter because before trial the 
defendant had the opportunity to depose the homeowner and ask about the identity of any 
important witnesses. The Court stated that if this were not satisfactory, the defendant 
should have renewed his Motion to Compel. Id. at 1114. The Court nonetheless addressed 
the abuse of discretion issue and concluded: 
[I]t was well within the trial court's discretion to deny Case's 
motion to compel Pack to provide the names of all the persons 
who participated in the construction of Pack's house. Such a 
request is overly broad and unduly burdensome because many 
workers participated in the construction of the house. 
Moreover, the majority of the workers involved in the 
construction of the house would not have set foot upon the 
roof of the house and would not have any knowledge of the 
work conducted on the roof. Therefore these employees could 
not have provided information relevant to the case. 
Id. at H 31 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, Ereren's discovery was objectionable for the very same reasons 
identified and upheld by the Court of Appeal in Pack. It was overly broad and unduly 
burdensome. Moreover, after his Motion to Compel was denied in March of 2000, Ereren 
deposed six Snowbird employees, including the Director of Mountain Operations (Bob 
Black) and the Ski School Director (Steve Bills). He had full opportunity to ask these 
witnesses for information regarding any potentially relevant witnesses and documents, and 
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he chose not to renew his Motion to Compel.1 Thus, Ereren's claim of error fails both 
substantively and procedurally. 
A. Interrogatory No. 12 of Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories. 
In this Interrogatory, Ereren requested identification and information about every 
ski instructor employed by Snowbird on March 8, 1995.2 Ereren contends this information 
was necessary for him to identify the ski instructor who taught his class on the day of the 
accident. 
First of all, this Interrogatory is clearly irrelevant and not calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence for the reason that Ereren alleged and later testified under 
oadi at trial that the accident occurred on March 9, 1995. Thus, the identity of instructors 
employed as of March 8, 1995, is meaningless. Secondly, the Interrogatory is not 
reasonably limited in scope. It is not limited to instructors who actually taught classes on 
March 9, 1995. And, it is not limited to blonde female instructors. Dr. Ereren plainly 
testified, both at deposition and at trial, that his instructor was blonde and female. (R. at 
1415, p. 28; R. at 1413, p. 488.) 
1
 In fact, Judge Wilkinson, who ruled on Erereifs only motion to compel, had 
retired and been replaced by Judge Livingston a month prior to the trial. Still, Ereren made 
no attempt to convince Judge Livingston to order production of any further information or 
documents prior to trial. 
2
 Interrogatory No. 12: Identify by name, address, and telephone number, every ski 
instructor working in your employ as of March 8, 1995, and state for each such person 
whether that person conducted any group ski lessons at the Snowbird ski area on that day. 
(R. at 55.) 
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Erereifs argument also ignores the fact that Snowbird produced logs for both 
March 8 and March 9, 1995, showing all of the classes taught on these days, the number of 
students per class and the names of the instructors who taught.3 While Ereren argues in his 
Brief that the logs were not necessarily accurate, Mr. Bills, the ski school director who kept 
die logs, testified at trial that the logs were accurate and that it was not possible for an 
instructor to teach a class and not be listed on the log for that day. (R. at 1412, pp. 374, 
391.) That testimony was undisputed. 
During the 1994-95 season, Snowbird employed approximately 230 ski instructors. 
(R. at 1417, p. 19.) Erereifs request for details on all of these instructors was plainly overly 
broad and unduly burdensome, given the parameters of the case established by Ereren's 
own allegations and testimony. Snowbird provided all available information on the 
identities of the instructors who taught ski classes on the day of, and the day before, the 
alleged accident. 
B. Interrogatory No. 14 of Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories. 
This Interrogatory requesting information on every person who took a ski lesson 
between March 5 and March 10, 1995, was also overly broad and not reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.4 Ereren claims that his purpose was to 
3
 See Addendum A hereto listing the logs produced by Snowbird; see also R. at 
1411, pp. 225-227, where logs were admitted into evidence. 
4
 Interrogatory No. 14: Identify, by name, address, and telephone number, every 
person who took one or more ski lessons at Snowbird at any time from March 5 through 
March 10, 1995, and, for each such person, state the type of lesson or lessons taken, the 
name or names of that person's instructor or instructors, and the date or dates on which 
such lesson or lessons was or were taken. (R. at 56.) 
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discover information about "Dr. Scott/3 a student allegedly in Ereren's ski class on March 9, 
1995. Dr. Ereren testified in his deposition that a male physician radiologist from Florida 
with a first name of "Scott53 was in his class and witnessed the accident. (R. at 1415, pp. 32 
& 35; R. at 1412, p. 445; R. at 1413, p. 521.) Snowbird did not keep lists of ski school 
students by name and it produced all ski school records it has for March 9, 1995. (R. at 
1411, p. 213-214; R. at 1412, p. 379-380; Addendum A.) 
While Ereren now attempts to argue that a "Sales Listing53 document showing names 
of people who purchased ski school tickets on March 9, 1995, was withheld from 
production, he misrepresents the trial testimony. (Plf s Br. p. 20.) Ereren5s counsel fully 
questioned Snowbird witnesses at trial as to why such a document had not been produced. 
Mr. Bills speculated that it had been found at one time, but could not later be located. (R. 
at 1412, pp. 364- 365.) Mr. Black, Director of Mountain Operations, however, clearly 
testified at trial that Snowbird had searched for the document and could not find it. (R. at 
1411, p. 213; R. at 1414, pp. 800-802.) Ereren tries now to argue that it could have been 
regenerated by computer, but there is no evidence that this six-year old record was still 
available on computer. 
Ironically, it was Ereren who knew the most about the alleged "Scott.55 He 
supposedly knew where this radiologist had done his residency, where he was practicing 
medicine and he knew other physicians who allegedly knew "Dr. Scott.53 Ereren, however, 
made no effort at all to locate "Dr. Scott55 until 2000 or the end 1999, almost five years 
after the accident occurred. Even at that point, his efforts were half-hearted. (R. at 1412, 
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pp. 446-449.) The Snowbird Ski School "Sales Listing53 shows names but no phone 
numbers, addresses or other identifying information. Indeed, even if a document such as 
this had contained a name with the first name of "Scott," there would be nothing to 
designate him as the "Scott55 whom Dr. Ereren claims to have been skiing with. 
Interrogatory No. 14 was clearly objectionable, and Snowbird produced all 
reasonably responsive information in its possession, in any event. 
C. Request No. 18 of Plaintiffs First Request for Production of 
Documents. 
This Interrogatory simply asked for all documents "referenced in your Answers to, 
and/or pertinent to, any of Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories.555 Other than as discussed 
above, Ereren fails in his Brief to identify or explain any alleged inadequacy in Snowbird5s 
response to this vague and overly broad request. Indeed, it is impossible for him to meet 
his burden of showing reversible error without marshaling and showing all the documents 
and information that were produced by Snowbird. Snowbird, in fact, produced 
supplemental documents and information informally on a number of occasions.6 
5
 Request for Production No. 18: All documents referenced in your Answers to, 
and/or pertinent to, any of Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, of even date herewith. 
(R. at 66.) 
6
 See Addendum A hereto. 
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D. Interrogatory No. 1 of Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories. 
In this Interrogatory, Ereren requested Snowbird to provide the names, addresses 
and phone numbers of all people from Florida who stayed at Snowbird any time between 
March 1 and 10 of 1995/ This too was clearly overly broad, unduly burdensome and not 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, it presented invasion 
of privacy concerns for Snowbird's many guests. As Snowbird argued to the trial Court, 
even assuming such five-year old lodging information existed, Snowbird could not justify 
allowing Erereifs counsel to contact and grill all of Snowbird's lodging guests from the 
State of Florida. (R. at 84-85.) 
Ereren claims he needed this information to locate the alleged ccDr. Scott." The 
Interrogatory, however, was not reasonably tailored even for this purpose. If Dr. Ereren 
skied with "Dr. Scott53 on March 9, 1995, as he alleged, why would he need Snowbird to 
produce records for all lodging guests for dates earlier than March 8? Significantly, Ereren 
never modified or attempted to narrow his request to address this defect. This request was 
invasive, overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible 
evidence. 
E. Interrogatory No. 2 of Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories. 
This Interrogatory requested Snowbird to check seminar attendee records and 
identify all people staying at Snowbird between March 1 and March 10, 1995, and thought 
7
 Interrogatory No. 1: State the name and address and phone number, as of that 
time, of every person who gave a Florida address and who stayed at the Cliff Lodge and/or 
any other facility operated by you at any time between March 1 and March 10, 1995. (R. 
at 61.) 
21 
to be physicians. It was objectionable for the same reasons as the preceding Interrogatory. 
Furthermore, Snowbird informed Ereren's counsel that Snowbird did not have seminar 
attendee records.9 Ereren argues in his Brief that the information Snowbird provided on 
medical conferences was "limited and unsatisfactory/5 (Plf s Br. p. 18). He conveniently 
ignores the fact that Snowbird gave him all the records and information it had on March 
1995 medical conferences and expressly informed Ereren's counsel of that. This 
information was provided with two letters from defense counsel in November 2000. (See 
letters from Snowbird counsel to plaintiffs counsel dated November 6 and November 15, 
2000, Addendum B hereto.) 
By the time Ereren filed his Motion to Compel, Snowbird had produced every 
document it could find with the "Ereren55 name on it. Snowbird produced every document 
it could reasonably locate naming Ereren, the ski instructors and students participating in 
ski school classes on March 8 and 9, 1995. The fact that the trial court did not order 
Snowbird to go to extraordinary lengths, compromising the privacy of guests, or to fish for 
some speculative piece of information, does not establish an abuse of discretion or any 
reason justifying vacating the jury's verdict. 
8
 Interrogatory No. 2: State the name and address and phone number as of that 
time of every person who you have reason to think, from seminar attendee records, 
registration records, and/or otherwise, was a physician and who stayed at the Cliff Lodge 
and/or other lodging facility operated by you at any time between March 1 and March 10, 
1995. (R. at 61.) 
9
 See letter from Snowbird counsel to plaintiffs counsel dated November 6, 2000, 
Addendum B hereto. 
Finally, all of Dr. Ereren's arguments regarding the alleged "Dr. Scott53 are 
precariously stacked on a series of very speculative assumptions including: a) that 
"Dr. Scott35 exists; b) that having his full name would enable him to be located despite the 
failure of all of Dr. Ereren5s efforts and contacts; c) that he witnessed anything of probative 
value to the case; d) that he could remember anything he may have witnessed six years 
earlier; and e) that he would cooperate in providing any information. 
POINT II 
EREREN FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING SNOWBIRD TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT FINANCIAL 
RECORDS, GAMBLING LOSSES AND DEBTS, AND 
BANKRUPTCY TO REFUTE EREREN'S CLAIMS FOR THE LOSS 
OF A FINANCIALLY VIABLE AND GROWING MEDICAL 
PRACTICE. 
Ereren challenges on appeal the trial court's determination to admit certain evidence 
directly pertaining to his past financial condition and records. Though admissibility of 
evidence is a legal question, "the trial court has a great deal of discretion in determining 
whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its ruling will not be overturned unless there is 
an abuse of discretion.55 Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99,1114, 17 P. 3d 1110. Even if 
an appellant is able to overcome the very high standard of demonstrating an abuse of 
discretion on a decision to admit evidence, he must further demonstrate that the abuse of 
discretion was harmful in its impact on the verdict. "Under Utah law, an erroneous 
decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is 
harmful.55 Tones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). 
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"Harmful error occurs where the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the 
error is sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in the verdict.33 Id. Not only does 
Ereren fail to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in Judge Livingston's evidentiary rulings, 
but he fails to show that there was any probability of a different verdict if the evidence had 
been excluded. Accordingly, the verdict must be affirmed. Id. at 360-361. 
A. Ereren Fails to Demonstrate Any Abuse of Discretion. 
Ereren claimed at trial that he had a very successful and growing practice as a general 
surgeon in southern California until he was injured at Snowbird. (R. 1411, p. 167). He 
claimed that his practice income decreased as a sole result of his injury.10 
Ereren's counsel, in his opening statement, presented gross income figures from the 
medical practice for 1988 through 1999 and argued that Ereren "had the world by its tail" 
in terms of his medical practice income in 1992 and 1993. (R. at 1411, p. 189). Ereren 
claimed that the past gross income figures from his practice were evidence of past lost 
income and indicative of the magnitude of his lost future earning capacity. (R. at 1411, 
p. 190). 
While Snowbird's case was certainly, and understandably, focused on the liability 
part of the case, Snowbird did put on a damage defense. Snowbird's defense was essentially 
that Ereren's presentation of past gross income figures from his practice was a misleading 
attempt to inflate damages and failed to tell the tale of the actual declining financial 
10
 Ereren's medical practice was operated as a sole proprietorship or dba of Ereren, 
not as a separate legal entity, and Ereren commingled his personal and practice funds. (R. at 
1415, pp. 8-9; R. at 1414, p. 760.) 
condition of Erereifs practice prior to the date of the alleged ski accident. The fact that he 
misrepresented and overstated his economic condition was supported in part by evidence 
that he had prepared two sets of financial statements: one for the purpose of obtaining a 
$500,000 loan for his practice; and the other, for internal bookkeeping purposes showing a 
much less robust practice. (R. at 1414, pp. 749-753.) 
Further evidence showed that once Ereren obtained the loan for his practice, he 
actually took the money to Las Vegas and lost it gambling. (R. at 1413, pp. 526 -532.) In 
addition to losing vast amounts of practice funds gambling, Ereren had incurred substantial 
legal expenses in a lawsuit with a California Hospital. After Ereren sued the hospital, 
claiming that it had breached oral and written contracts, the hospital countersued against 
him for defaulting on another substantial practice loan. (R. at 1413, pp. 526, 530, 534.) 
In the course of that litigation, Ereren alleged that the hospital, long before his March 1995 
trip to Snowbird, had caused him to suffer neck pain, headaches, stress, and caused him to 
lose a large percentage of his surgery referrals, all resulting in a financially devastating 
decline in his practice income. (R. at 1413, pp. 534, 537, 539-540, 544. 547.) Ereren's 
consequent inability to pay back his practice debts, loan interest and attorneys fees, caused 
him to file for bankruptcy in 1997. (R. at 1415, pp. 3-4; R. at 1414, p. 754.) All of these 
facts went directly to refute Ereren's claim that he "had the world by its tail" in terms of the 
financial health and viability of his medical practice, prior to the alleged ski accident. 
It is understandable that Ereren's counsel attempted to sanitize the true and complete 
picture of his client by objecting to parts of Snowbird's damage defense. However, the fact 
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that some of the evidence reflected poorly on Erereif s overall credibility did not make it 
inadmissible. Indeed, it would clearly have been improper for the court to deprive 
Snowbird of its opportunity to put on evidence refuting the plaintiffs damages claims just 
because the evidence was also detrimental to Erereifs credibility and overall case.11 
1. Conflicting Financial Statements. 
Although Ereren attempts to characterize the admission of evidence of his conflicting 
financial statements as a Rule 608 issue, it was in fact a Rule 402 issue. Rule 608 pertains 
to extrinsic evidence of character or specific instances of conduct introduced solely for the 
purpose of impeaching a witness's credibility. If the evidence was properly admitted under 
Rule 402 as relevant to Ereren's damage claims, admissibility under Rule 608 is irrelevant. 
Contrary to Erereifs argument, the financial statements were introduced into 
evidence based on their relevance and probative value regarding Ereren's true financial 
picture. (R. at 1414, pp. 730 and 735-736.) Snowbird never attempted to introduce this 
evidence under Rule 608. Its relevance to Erereifs damage claims is a Rule 402 question, 
and any issue plaintiff raised as to unfair prejudice was a Rule 403 issue. Furthermore, it is 
apparent from the Trial Transcript that Judge Livingston also admitted this evidence under 
Rule 402 based on the its apparent relevance to the financial condition of Ereren's medical 
practice prior to the alleged ski injury, not for the purpose of impeaching or attacking 
Ereren's character. (R. at 1414, pp. 726-727 and 730-731.) 
11
 See Judge Livingston's statements explaining the basis of his ruling, R. at 1414, 
pp. 726-727, 730-731 and 735. 
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Plaintiff appears to complain that it was improper for counsel to use admissible 
testimony on the damages issue to also impeach plaintiffs credibility. Plaintiff assumes that 
evidence, once admitted, can only be argued for a single purpose. It is true that by the time 
he made his closing argument, Snowbird's counsel had made a strategic decision to focus 
his argument on the liability case and not waste his limited time discussing damages. Part 
of the reason for this was to hopefully project an impression of confidence in the defense of 
the liability case and to convey the expectation that the jury would not reach the damages 
case in its deliberations. Certainly, the decision to avoid discussion of damages in closing 
argument does not retroactively render inadmissible evidence which was otherwise admitted 
as relevant to the defense on damages. 
The term "relevant evidence" is used to describe "evidence that has any tendency to 
prove or disprove the existence of any material fact." State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8,11 27, 
994 P.2d 177 (emphasis added). See also Utah KEvid. 401. "Under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 401, any evidence that is slightly probative in value is relevant." Colwell, 2000 
UT 8 at 1! 27 (emphasis added). In other words, to be irrelevant, evidence must have no 
probative value. If there is any probative value, the evidence is both relevant and 
admissible. Utah R.Evid. 401 & 402. 
Relevant evidence "may" be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by danger of prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. Utah 
R.Evid. 403 (emphasis added). Rule 403 does not require the exclusion of such evidence, 
but merely gives the Court discretion to do so if the threshold is met. 
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As discussed above, Ereren's counsel argued that Ereren had a viable, growing 
medical practice until it was ruined by his alleged ski injury. His economist, Dr. Randle, 
further testified to substantial damage figures which he calculated based on projections from 
averaging Erereifs past medical practice income, from 1989 through 1994, and assuming 
that his practice would have continued as a viable source of income into the future. (R. at 
1413, pp. 682-683.) He also testified that he had analyzed Ereren's business expenses and 
determined that they were relatively fixed. (R. at 1413, p. 681.) Dr. Randle, however, 
failed to consider as "expenses" the unpaid principal and interest on Ereren's practice loans 
and the general decline in his practice that had commenced long before March 1995. (R. at 
1413, p. 681). Dr. Randle did admit that for a physician in private practice to be 
economically successful, he must also be a good businessman. (R. at 1413, p. 704.) 
Snowbird presented its own economist, Mr. Hoffman, to refute Ereren's damage 
claims and the testimony of Dr. Randle. Mr. Hoffman reviewed Ereren's financial records 
including tax returns, profit and loss statements, and financial statements, among other 
documents. (R. at 1414, p. 742.) He testified that these were the type of documents, 
which he, as a CPA, typically reviews in evaluating the viability of a business such as 
Ereren's medical practice. (R. at 1414, pp. 742-743.) Like Dr. Randle, Mr. Hoffman 
looked at business expenses, but he concluded that the documents reflected a significant 
increasing trend in interest expenses, not fixed expenses as Dr. Randle testified. (R. at 
1414, p. 745.) Mr. Hoffman investigated the interest expenses further by reviewing the 
loan documentation from Ereren's business and the financial statements. He concluded 
from these statements that the business was borrowing substantial funds that were not 
being put into the business, and the business was accordingly declining under its debt 
burden. (R. at 1414, p. 755.) It was an integral part of Mr. Hoffman's testimony to 
review Erereifs financial statements, whether they conflicted or not, and to explain which 
information he used in his analysis. (R. at 1414, p. 751-755.) 
The financial statements were plainly relevant in light of the argument of Ereren's 
counsel and the testimony of Dr. Randle. The fact that they also revealed inconsistencies or 
unreliability of Ereren's financial documentation and reporting, did not make the evidence 
inadmissible. 
2. Gambling Losses. 
Ereren challenges Judge Livingston's admission of the evidence of Ereren's gambling 
only on the grounds of Rules 402 and 403. The probative value of Ereren's gambling losses 
is apparent, however, when one considers plaintiffs argument that gross business profits 
reflected a viable business, expected to continue into the future, but for his ski injury. (R. at 
1411, pp. 188-192.) 
What made Dr. Ereren's gambling relevant to his damage claims was the frequency 
and amount of his losses, the sources of his gambling funds, and the fact that he apparentiy 
gambled away funds loaned to him expressly for business purposes. The causation issue for 
the jury was whether the alleged accident caused the failure of Dr. Ereren's surgical practice 
and resulted in financial ruin. Evidence of another cause, especially one which is as 
pronounced as demonstrated by Dr. Ereren's gambling history, was relevant to and highly 
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probative of the causation question and bears materially on the overall damage issue. 
Certainly, a businessman who invests his business loan proceeds by gambling in Las Vegas 
is not a "good businessman,33 particularly where he loses all of the loan proceeds and is then 
unable to make the loan payments. Such a business does not have a bright future. 
The First Circuit addressed the issue of whether evidence of gambling was admissible 
under Rule 403 in a personal injury trial in Dente v. Riddell Inc., 664 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 
1981). In Dente, the plaintiff alleged that his social life had been ruined by the defendant's 
negligence. The appellate court upheld the trial court's admission of evidence of gambling 
as demonstrating that the injury did not exist. In the process, the court observed that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, identical to the Utah rule, gives the court discretion to admit 
the evidence even if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for 
prejudice. Id. at 5. The court held that the gambling evidence "was germane to the cause 
of Dente3s physical and mental condition-a central and hotly contested issue.33 Id. 
Approving the trial court's decision to "put everything on the table, in full view of those 
responsible for deciding this case,33 the court noted that "the balance should be struck in 
favor of admission.33 Id. at 6. 
There can be no question that Erereifs huge gambling losses of business loan funds 
were relevant to the financial condition of his medical practice.12 This leaves only the 
question of whether its probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
R. at 1413, p. 530; R. at 1414, p. 754-755. 
n r\ 
Ereren failed to make any showing of such prejudice. Instead, he simply asked the 
court to assume that evidence of Las Vegas gambling is unfairly prejudicial. It is well 
known, however, that gambling such as that done by Ereren in Las Vegas is entirely legal 
and a very popular pastime for a great many Americans. Indeed, Snowbird's counsel 
himself admitted to the jury that he had been known to gamble on occasion as well. (R. at 
1411, pp. 202-203.) 
At Ereren's request, the Court asked on jury voir dire whether any of the prospective 
jurors had personal feelings about gambling which would detract from their ability to be 
fair and impartial. (R. at 1411, pp. 124-125.) Only one of the prospective jurors indicated 
that it would be a problem, and that person did not serve on the jury.13 The others 
indicated that they held no strong feelings about gamblers or gambling that would affect 
their impartiality. (R. at 1411, p. 124.) Having asked the Court to cover this issue on voir 
dire, Ereren cannot now contend that the jury panel was dishonest and was prejudiced by 
the very type of evidence they indicated would not affect their impartiality.14 
Evidence of Ereren's gambling did not pose any significant threat of unfair prejudice, 
and the jury voir dire confirms that. 
13
 In response to Erereifs requested voir dire regarding gambling, Ms. Hansen 
indicated that she could not be impartial. (R. at 1411, p. 125.) She did not serve on the 
jury. (See R. at 1094.) 
14
 Snowbird points this out as an indication of lack of prejudice. It is, however, 




As with his argument pertaining to gambling, Ereren challenges the admission of 
evidence of his bankruptcy under Rules 402 and 403. (Plf s Br. pp. 25-26.) The issues are 
the same as with the gambling evidence, and in fact the gambling and bankruptcy records 
are necessarily intertwined. As pointed out in Snowbird's cross-examination of Ereren, he 
had large gambling debts which were apparently discharged in bankruptcy. (R. at 1413, 
pp. 530-532.) These records related directly to the conflicting financial pictures painted by 
Ereren and Snowbird, and lent support to the analysis of Mr. Hoffman and his opinion that 
gambling losses of business funds and excessive debt, rather than any ski injury, were direct 
causes of the significant decline in Ereren's medical practice. 
As with his argument regarding gambling, Ereren asked the Court to simply assume 
that evidence of bankruptcy was per se unfairly prejudicial, so as to outweigh the probative 
value. Bankruptcy proceedings however, simply provide a perfectly legal avenue for people 
who cannot pay their bills to obtain relief from their debts. Evidence of bankruptcy is no 
more prejudicial than evidence of an inability to pay one's debts. While this evidence might 
well have been prejudicial to Ereren's damage case—and certainly Snowbird hoped it would 
be-there was nothing to indicate unfair prejudice. For example, Snowbird never argued 
that Ereren was untrustworthy because he had filed bankruptcy. 
Finally, the effect of evidence of bankruptcy was also part of Erereifs requested voir 
dire to the jury, with the same result. Judge Livingston gave a cautionary instruction as to 
the bankruptcy evidence and none of the jurors selected to serve at trial felt that evidence of 
bankruptcy would affect dieir impartiality. (R. at 1411, pp. 126-127.) 
Evidence of Ereren's bankruptcy did not pose any significant threat of unfair 
prejudice, and again, the cautionary instruction of the Court and the jury voir dire assured 
that. 
B. Ereren Fails to Establish That the Court's Ruling Was Harmful. 
Ereren is obligated under Utah law to establish that these rulings affected the 
outcome of the jury's verdict. Tones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 
(Utah 1997). To do so, he must essentially marshal all of the other evidence supporting the 
verdict and demonstrate that all of the other evidence is not enough to maintain confidence 
in the jury's verdict. Erereifs Brief offers nothing beyond a couple of conclusory statements 
to establish that Judge Livingston's evidentiary rulings were harmful. (Plf s Br. pp. 25-26.) 
In its Special Verdict, the jury found that Ereren failed to prove that the accident he 
described occurred. (R. at 1257-1259.) This was not at all surprising. There were many 
substantial reasons for the jury to doubt Erereifs credibility that had nothing to do with 
bankruptcy, gambling, or conflicting financial statements. 
The following are just some of the examples of the abundant evidence at trial which 
caused the jury to reject Ereren's story. 
a. Ereren first claimed that the accident took place on March 8, 1995, 
(R. at 1-6). Then, at his deposition, he changed it to March 9, 1995. (R. at 1415, 
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pp. 27-28.) Even so, he never notified Snowbird of the alleged accident until years 
later. (R. at 1415, pp. 52-54.) 
b. Ereren could not identify a single witness to the accident other than 
the elusive "Dr. Scott55 who has never been located. (R. at 1415, pp., 34-36.) 
c. Collisions involving Snowbird ski school participants are always 
reported by the class instructor, yet there is no record of any accident involving 
Ereren. (R. at 1417, pp. 46-48, 53; R. at 1416, pp. 48-50; R. at 1411, pp. 174-
175.) 
d. Ereren changed his testimony during the litigation as to the location of 
the alleged accident. (R. at 1415, pp. 40-42; R. at 717-720; R. at 1413, pp. 501-
502, 505-506.) 
e. The location which Ereren identified was not in an area where 
beginning or immediate ski classes were taught. (R. at 1412, pp. 321-322, 353-354, 
399.) 
f. The location Ereren identified was not one in which skiers or boarders 
frequently jumped. (R. at 1416, p. 89; R. at 1417, p. 59; R. at 1419, pp. 45-46; 
R. at 1418, pp. 54-55.) Nor was it one where there were line of sight problems. 
(R. at 1416, p. 89; R. at 1417, pp. 59-60, 64-66; R. at 1418, pp. 54, 59-60.) 
g. According to Ereren5s testimony, he was forcefully struck in the head 
and neck and knocked down the hill by a phantom snowboarder. (R. at 1412, 
p. 461.) Ereren got up, dusted himself off and skied the rest of the way down the 
mountain. (R. at 1412, p. 464; R. at 1413, p. 511.) To do so from the location of 
the alleged accident, Ereren would have had to ski down a "black diamond53 (most 
difficult) mogul run, as a beginning skier in a dazed, injured condition. (R. at 1411, 
p. 267.) 
h. Despite his claim that he had been severely injured in the alleged 
accident at Snowbird, Ereren took his young family back to Snowbird the following 
year for another ski vacation. (R. at 1413, pp. 519-521.) 
i. The only female Snowbird ski instructors who taught classes on 
March 9, 1995, of the size and level described by Ereren, testified unequivocally and 
credibly that they would have remembered any such accident and it did not occur in 
their classes. (R. at 1412, pp. 320, 322-323, 343-344, 351, 355-356.) 
j . Ereren testified falsely at trial that, prior to his ski injury, he had never 
before had any significant neck pain or injury affecting his ability to work. (R. at 
1413, p. 517.) In fact, in 1994 Ereren had filed pleadings in a California lawsuit in 
which he claimed injuries in the form of headaches, neck pain, fatigue, and stress. 
He alleged that his injuries had been caused by the defendant hospital and he sought 
millions of dollars in damages. (R. at 1413, pp. 534-537.) He continued to pursue 
those claims against the hospital defendant in December 1995 even after his alleged 
injury at Snowbird, and he never revealed his alleged ski injury to the defendant in 
his California lawsuit. (R. at 1413, pp. 517-548.) 
k. Ereren had also included in his 1994 lawsuit against the California 
hospital claims for loss of his medical practice business. He claimed that he was 
working 30 to 40 percent less in 1993 as a result of wrongful conduct of the 
hospital. (R. at 1413, pp. 544-547.) 
1. Although his wife was identified in pretrial documents as a trial15 
witness and was with him during his March 1995 ski vacation, she never appeared at 
trial to verify or support his allegations of injury on March 9, 1995, or to testify 
about his symptoms during the ensuing years. (R. at 1414, pp. 2-5, 847.) 
The above are just some of the examples of the overwhelming evidence at trial which 
gave the jury reason to disbelieve Ereren's uncorroborated tale and to find that he failed to 
meet his burden of establishing that the alleged accident even occurred. This, of course, 
does not even take into account the invaluable opportunity the jury had to observe Erereifs 
evasive demeanor while testifying. 
Ereren has made no effort to satisfy his burden of demonstrating the probability of a 
different verdict if Judge Livingston had excluded evidence of Ereren's bankruptcy, Las 
Vegas gambling, and conflicting financial statements. The evidence on these issues was 
insignificant in comparison to the all of the other overwhelming evidence which 
understandably served to destroy Ereren's credibility with the jury. 
15
 R. at 181-185. 
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POINT III 
EREREN FAILS TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT 
JUDGE LIVINGSTON CLEARLY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING TESTIMONY FROM EREREN'S SURPRISE 
"REBUTTAL55 WITNESS AT TRIAL. 
Ereren's fourth argument on appeal is that Judge Livingston abused his discretion in 
precluding plaintiff from calling a surprise "rebuttal" witness, not disclosed16 until midway 
through the trial. He argues that this witness should have been allowed to testify to "rebut53 
testimony of Snowbird witnesses to the effect that the area of the alleged accident was not 
known to be one in which skiers frequently jumped. Ereren argues that he and his counsel 
were "surprised55 by this "new testimony,55 alleging it to be false. 
Mr. Collins, Ereren5s counsel, argued to Judge Livingston that he had talked to a 
lawyer friend the night of the first trial day and discovered that this friend had skied at 
Snowbird in 1995. He proffered that this friend, Mr. Gilchrist, would testify that the area 
of die accident was "very frequently used for jumping.55 (R. at 1412, pp. 404-406.) 
Snowbird opposed admission of any testimony by this surprise witness and argued that the 
proffered testimony would be inadmissable opinion testimony from a lay witness and was 
not in fact legitimate rebuttal testimony, as there was no basis for Ereren to claim surprise at 
16
 The Court5s Scheduling Order required plaintiff to designate all fact and expert 
witnesses by July 28, 2000. (R. at 162.) Plaintiff did not identify Mr. Gilchrist in his 
Designation or later supplemental designations. (See R. at 181, 491 and 494.) 
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the testimony of Snowbird witnesses. (R. at 1412, pp. 404-410.) Judge Livingston agreed 
and excluded Mr. Gilchrist from testifying.17 (R. at 1412, pp. 412-414.) 
Ereren fails in his Brief to cite any legal authority at all in support of this argument 
that Judge Livingston clearly abused his discretion. This is not surprising, given that both 
the record and controlling case law solidly support the ruling. 
This case is very similar to the case of Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 
1994), in which the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court's exclusion of a plaintiffs 
proffered rebuttal witness not disclosed prior to trial. In that case, the plaintiffs counsel 
claimed she was surprised by defendant's argument during the first day of trial that a stop 
sign had been partially obscured by foliage and that the accident was not defendant's fault. 
Plaintiffs counsel went out on the evening of the first trial day and located a witness living 
in the area of the intersection who would purportedly testify that the stop sign was not 
obscured at the time of the accident. On the morning of the second day of trial, plaintiffs 
counsel moved the court to allow the newly found witness to testify as a "rebuttal" witness. 
Id. at 1023. The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion on the grounds that the witness 
had not been previously disclosed and that defendant's witness testimony regarding 
obstruction of the sign could reasonably have been anticipated by the plaintiff. Id 
It is well within a trial Court's discretion to order the parties to 
disclose all potential witnesses prior to trial.... [A] trial court 
does not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a party to call 
a surprise witness absent "good cause" for the failure to disclose 
17
 Judge Livingston also noted that Mr. Collins stated that Dr. Ereren himself would 
testify that he had later observed the area of the accident to be one where skiers or boarders 
frequently jumped. (R. at 1414, pp. 409-410 and 413.) 
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the witness as required by a court order or rule. When the 
offering party contends that the undisclosed witness is necessary 
to rebut the adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on 
whether the evidence "sought to be rebutted could reasonably 
have been anticipated prior to trial." 
Id at 1024. 
As the appellant, Ereren "has the burden of showing that the trial court erred in 
determining that the "new testimony" could have been anticipated." Id To meet his 
burden, Ereren "must provide the Court with a complete record of all the evidence relevant 
to the alleged error." Id Like the plaintiff in Turner, Ereren has failed to provide the 
Court any citations to the extensive deposition testimony of Snowbird employees, and other 
evidence relating to the issue of whether the area of the alleged accident was an area known 
for frequent jumping. Without marshaling this evidence, plaintiff cannot carry his burden 
of demonstrating that the testimony of Snowbird witnesses at trial was new or "could not 
have been reasonably anticipated." Id 
Ereren claims surprise at the "new testimony35 at trial of Snowbird employees Black 
and Durtschi that "the area described by Dr. Ereren is one where skiers and snowboarders 
infrequently, if ever, jump." (Plfs Br. p. 27.) Even a cursory examination of the record, 
however, demonstrates diat the issue of whether a Snowbird instructor negligently placed 
Ereren in a dangerous area known for jumping was a central issue in the case from the 
outset, and Snowbird witnesses testified at trial consistently with their prior deposition 
testimony given six months before trial. The following are just a few examples: 
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A. Ereren's Amended Complaint ITU 7 and 8: 
In paragraph 7 of the Amended Complaint, Ereren alleged that the ski instructor 
positioned him "at a location defendant knew or should have known was not a safe 
location.53 (R. at 24.) In paragraph 8, Ereren alleged that Snowbird was negligent in failing 
to "prevent skiers and snowboarders from jumping into the location in which plaintiff was 
positioned." Id 
B. Mr. Black's Deposition: 
Q. [Mr. Collins] . . . Have you seen people jumping from above 
Rothman's way across - excuse me, launching from the downhill edge 
of Rothman's Way and landing in the area known as Chip's Face on 
this map and/or the area between Chip's Face and where Rothman's 
Way intersects the Peruvian lift line?18 
A. [Mr. Black] No. 
(R. at 1416, p. 89.) 
C. Ms. Durtschi's Deposition: 
Q. [Mr. Collins] Have you ever seen in any of your time up at Snowbird 
as an instructor or just free skiing, have you ever seen anybody, ...., 
anybody become airborne, a skier or a snowboarder coming off of the 
part of Rothman Way between Phone 3 and where the cat track 
begins? Have you ever seen anybody getting air off of that? 
A. [Ms. Durtschi] They would be an acrobat if they do. 
Q. Why do you say that? 
A. Because there is no air. 
18
 Mr. Collins represented during the depositions of Mr. Black and Ms. Durtschi 
that Erereifs recollection was that somewhere in this large, general area below Rothman 
Way and in the vicinity of Chip's Face was where the accident occurred. (R. at 1416, p. 17; 
R. at 1418, p. 60.) 
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Q. And per chance, just talking to ski instructors or people up there, have 
you ever heard tale of any such thing? 
A. No. 
(R. at 1418, pp. 54 & 57.) 
There can be no doubt that the trial testimony of Mr. Black and Ms. Durtschi that 
the area of the alleged accident was not known to be an area in which skiers jumped was 
consistent with their prior deposition testimony. The issue had been raised first in the 
Amended Complaint and Ereren and his counsel failed to demonstrate that this testimony at 
trial was either new or not reasonably anticipatable. In fact, it was Ereren's burden to prove 
his allegations that the area was dangerous because people frequently jumped there. If there 
was anything new about the testimony, it was due solely to Ereren, prior to trial, changing 
his own testimony to allege that the accident took place at a different location than he 
identified in his deposition. If Ereren's counsel asked the witnesses about jumping at the 
wrong location on the mountain, that is certainly Ereren's own fault. There was nothing 
inconsistent about the testimony of the Snowbird witnesses. Only Ereren's testimony was 
different from his deposition. 
Judge Livingston's ruling excluding the proffered testimony of Mr. Gilchrist was 
appropriately within the court's sound discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, Appellant Ereren has failed to meet his burden on appeal of 
establishing any abuse of discretion warranting a new trial. Appellee Snowbird respectfully 
requests that the jury's verdict and the judgment on that verdict be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <^Sday of January, 2002. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By W A A A A O 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
Attorneys for Appellee Snowbird 
Corporation 
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I hereby certify that on the 25 day of January, 2002, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee Snowbird Corporation were mailed postage 
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Morton, 623 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, ^ h 84106. 
- f) A 
93982.1 




DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY DEFENDANT SNOWBIRD 
1. 1994-95 Skier's Trail and Safety Guide (R. at 554-555, 1330, 1331) 
2. Daily Log for March 8, 1995 (R. at 122, 367) 
3. Snowbird Ski Patrol Winter Operations Plan, 1994-95 (R. at 101) 
4. Snowbird Ski School Daily Sales Edit Listings (R. at 123-126) 
5. Daily Logs for March 5-10, 1995 (R. at 364-379) 
6. Daily Log for March 9,1995 (R. at 368) 
7. Snowbird Group Sales - Booking Reports for March 1995 (R. 332-333) 
8. Photographs of female ski instructors, 1995 (R. at 106-112) 
9. Sid instructors manual (excerpts) (R. at 57, 1319) 
* * •* 
The following documents were produced by Snowbird, either formally in response to 
document requests or interrogatories, or informally, but are not part of the record. 
10. Notes on Weather and Snow Conditions for March 1-10, 1995 
11. Mountain Checklists for Grooming, etc. for March 1-10, 1995 
12. Health and Safety Guidelines for Snowbird Ski School 
13. Camp Snowbird Ski School Records for March 5-10, 1995 
14. Mountain Checklists for Grooming, etc. for March 10-12,1995 
15. Tram Announcement for March 9,1995 
16. Project Work Sheet for March 9,1995 
17. Hidden Peak Dispatch Log for March 9,1995 
18. Daily Sweep Sheet (undated) 
19. Meteorological Records for March 9, 1995-2000 
ADDENDUM B 
SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE FROM SNOWBIRD'S 
COUNSEL TO EREREN'S COUNSEL REGARDING DISCOVERY ISSUES 
1. April 24, 2000, letter from Dennis C. Ferguson to Peter Collins regarding 
identification of ski instructor 
2. May 2, 2000, letter from Dennis C. Ferguson to Peter Collins regarding deposition 
scheduling and identification of ski instructor 
3. June 29, 2000, letter from Dennis C. Ferguson to Peter Collins regarding 
identification of ski instructor 
4. November 6, 2000, letter from Kurt M. Frankenburg to Peter Collins identifying 
medically related organizations which held conferences at Snowbird in March 1995, 
and stating that Snowbird does not have records identifying the attendees 
(R. at 332-333) 
5. November 15, 2000, letter from Kurt M. Frankenburg to Peter Collins enclosing all 
the information Snowbird has regarding associations which held meetings at 
Snowbird in March 1995 
6. November 15, 2000, letter from Kurt M. Frankenburg to Peter Collins stating that 
Snowbird has responded reasonably to plaintiffs discovery requests with what 
discoverable information it has 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678 
ENNIS C. FERGUSON ~,ww* TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678 
April 24, 2000 FAX <8OD 364-4500 
E-MAIL dferguson@wilhunt.com 
Peter C. Collins 
BUDGEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Re: Ereren v. Snowbird Corporation 
Our File No.: 1212.0016 
Dear Pete: 
The name of the ski instructor depicted in photograph 14 and identified by your 
client as the one who taught the ski school clasess he was in on March 8 and March 9, 
1995 is Andrea Martin. As is readily apparent from the daily logs for March 8 and 
March 9, Andrea was not one of the ski instructors working. Indeed, we have confirmed 
that she was not working at all at Snowbird during the time in question. Please let me 
know how you want to proceed at this juncture. Perhaps Dr. Ereren would like to take 
another stab at identifying the ski instructor. Please remember that the reason that I 
proceeded in this manner was that Dr. Ereren testified at his deposition that he would be 
able to recognize the ski instructor from the photograph. If he cannot do so, please let me 
know that and we will proceed in another manner in an attempt to identify the instructor 
or instructors who would have taught his class on the 8th and 9th. Indeed, based upon Dr. 
Ereren's prior testimony, we have narrowed the field. Dr. Ereren has testified that he took 
a ski school class from the same, blonde ski instructor on the 8th and 9th. Given Dr. * 
Ereren's testimony with regard to his ski level, there are only four women who taught level 
2, 3 or 4 classes on both days. There names are listed as ccDumas (first name Georgia), 
Nancy, Shirley and Gwen." Thus, assuming that Dr. Ereren actually took a ski school 
class on the 9th, the field of possibilities, given his past testimony is very narrow. At this 
juncture, however, I would like to know whether Dr. Ereren actually recognizes the ski 
instructor or not before proceeding with identification of the person or persons whom we 
believe would have been the ski instructor. 
With regard to your request for other information, we still have not been able to 
find the book that contains the computer printout of daily sales for ski school classes. 
Please understand, however, that when you initially requested information, we searched all 
Peter C. Collins - 2 - April 24, 2000 
of our records and made copies of any documents containing the Ereren name. Thus, it is 
unlikely that there will be a reference to Ereren for March 10 that shows a ski school 
purchase for March 9. The book that contains the hard copies of these listings has 
apparently been misplaced during a move and we are still searching for it. 
With regard to your request for records from the Cliff Lodge, I believe that issue 
has been dealt with in our formal discovery responses. 
With regard to your reasons for wanting to take depositions of male ski instructors, 
I have several problems. First, at such time as we can identify the most likely candidate or 
candidates for the actual ski school instructor, you will have the opportunity to depose her 
or them. We will make available Steve Bills who is the ski school director and the person 
who would have been the supervisor of the relevant ski instructors on the dates in 
question. You have also requested to take the deposition of Bob Black, the Mountain 
Operations Director. Thus, it appears to me that you will have ample opportunity to ask 
from these witnesses the questions that you have highlighted in your letter of April 18, 
2000. I suggest that we proceed with scheduling the depositions of these people first. 
Before scheduling any depositions, however, I need to receive your answers to the 
outstanding discovery requests, and I want to continue in our effort to identify the ski 
instructor. If you have a problem in proceeding in that manner, please let me know. 
Very truly yours, 
W n . A M S & H U N T 
DenmrC. Ferguson 
DCF/ple 
cc: Bob Black 
79776 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
SALT IAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678 
RT M. FRANKENBURG 
May 2, 2000 
Peter C. Collins 
BUDGEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Re: Brer en v. Snowbird Corporation 
Our File No.: 1212.0016 
Dear Pete: 
Thank you for your letter of May 1st. I am enclosing herewith a proposed 
stipulated schedule. 
With regard to depositions, we are available on June 5th and 6th for depositions. 
We will, of course, have to see who the witnesses are and if they are available on those 
days. We expect that you will be providing us with your written discovery responses prior 
to that time, as they are already overdue. 
I think that we are all in agreement that we should avoid unnecessary and/or 
unproductive depositions. To that end, we want to make sure we have done our best to 
properly identify Dr. Ereren's ski instructor on the day in question. 
Your client has testified that he had the same blonde female ski instructor on March 
8th and March 9th. From reviewing the ski school records (previously provided), it appears 
that there were only four female ski instructors who taught classes on both March 8th and 
9th for levels 7 and below. One of these was Nancy "High Pockets", who Dr. Ereren 
identified as teaching his wife on those days. We do not have a picture of her. Photos of 
the other three instructors are identified as photos 5, 7 and 15 in the set of photos we 
have provided to you. 
Please provide us with a signed supplemental interrogatory response indicating 
whether Dr. Ereren can identify his instructor out of these three photos. If he cannot, 
please indicate so in the response and we will attempt to narrow the options some other 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678 
FAX (801) 364-4500 
E-MAIL kfrankenburg@wilhunt.com 
Peter C. Collins - 2 - May 2, 2000 
way We believe we are entitled to have a response in evidentiary form and also need an 
identification so that we can produce the most appropriate witness for deposition. 
If for some reason you are not willing to proceed as suggested, please let me know 
in the near future. 
Very truly yours, 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
KMF/mcw 
Enclosure 
ccw/Enc: Bob Black 
Judy Murray 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678 
NNIS C FERGUSON TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678 
June 29, 2000 FAX <eoi) 364-4500 
E-MAIL dferguson@wilhunt.com 
Peter C. Collins 
BUDGEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Re: Ereren v. Snowbird Corporation 
Our File No.: 1212.0016 
Dear Pete: 
I am responding to your letter of June 16, 2000. Representations in your letter 
require that I first respond to your factual representations regarding the status of Dr. 
Ereren's deposition testimony. You have indicated that Dr. Ereren "is not certain whether 
his instructor had blonde or light brown hair." I direct your attention to page 28 of Dr. 
Ereren's deposition where he states "she was I believe in her late 20's, 5f6", 5f4", blonde, 
120 to 130 pounds, difficult to tell with the outfit." Dr. Ereren did not equivocate on the 
color of the ski instructor's hair. Indeed, I can find nowhere in the index where the word 
"brown" even appears in the deposition transcript. 
You also indicate that Dr. Ereren "has not unequivocally stated that there were four 
people in his class on March 9, 1995." I call your attention to pages 32 and 42 of the 
deposition. On page 32 ,1 first asked Dr. Ereren how many people were in his class the 
day before on the 8th of March, and he said "two to four." I asked him how many people 
were in his class on the 9th, and he said "I believe there were four." He then went on to 
specifically identify the people whom he believed to have been in the class. Later at page 
35, he testifies that he believes that the physician that was in his ski class as well as the 
others "were waiting at the bottom of the slope" and he believes they were looking at him 
ski while he was coming down the hill. At page 42, Dr. Ereren relates in some detail that 
the oriental student in the class was told that she would be better off in a different class or 
level and that Dr. Ereren continued to ski in the class with the physician, the physician's 
wife and the ski instructor. I do not believe this testimony to be equivocal in any way and 
if Dr. Ereren attempts to testify differently at trial, I will point that out to the jury. 
Peter C. Collins - 2 - June 29, 2000 
Once again, given Dr. Ereren's testimony regarding his skiing ability, the 
description of the ski instructor, the number of students in the class, Georgia Dumais 
appears to be the only logical person who would have been his ski instructor on March 9, 
1995. 
I suggest that we proceed with the deposition of Georgia Dumais. If, after her 
deposition, you believe there is a reasonable factual basis for taking the deposition of the 
other ski instructors, then we can explore that issue at that juncture. If this is agreeable, I 
will check the availability of Georgia Dumais and Mr. Baker for the months of July and 
August. Please let me know. 
Very truly yours, 
S & H U N T 
zC. Ferguson 
DCF/ple 81338 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678 
JRT M. FRANKENBURG TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678 
FAX (801) 364-4500 
N o v e m b e r 6 , 2 0 0 0 E-MAIL kfrankenburg@wilhunt.com 
Peter C. Collins, Esq. Via Facsimile and U.S. Mail 
BUDGEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Re: Ever en v. Snowbird Corporation 
Our File No.: 1212.0016 
Dear Pete: 
We have received your letter of November 1, 2000. 
With respect to Andrea Martin, we have produced the ski school records which 
demonstrate that she did not work on the days in question, and we have given you our 
professional representations that we have spoken with her and her memory is no different. 
Given our efforts to cooperate, we are disappointed in your continued insistence in taking 
her deposition. You know that all evidence in the case supports the fact that Ms. Martin 
has no knowledge of the accident. As you now suggest, we will file a motion for a 
protective order. 
I am puzzled by your continued insistence that we have our client verify our 
responses to plaintiffs third and fourth sets of interrogatories. I have reviewed the copies 
of the responses which were enclosed with your letter and I do not see where any 
substantive responses were given. Objections were made and you were referred to 
documents already produced. It is really not a big deal, but I don't think verification of 
these responses is required by the rules, and it is a bit of a hassle for me and my client. I 
prefer not to waste time and expense in providing unnecessary signatures. 
In response to your now modified request that we identify medical associations 
which held conferences at Snowbird during 1995, a search of records reveals that there 
appear to be 11 medically related organizations which held conferences in March, 1995 at 
Snowbird. They are: University of Utah, School of Internal Medicine; Spalding Regional 
Hospital; Association for Applied Clinical Info Systems; Health Point/Glaxo 
Pharmaceuticals; Merck & Co.; College of American Pathologists; Discovery IntL/Otsuka 
Peter C. Collins, Esq. - 2 - November 6, 2000 
Pharmaceuticals; First Health; Utah Valley Cardiology; SNR Genesis Knee Meeting; G D 
Searle; and Incare Medical. Snowbird does not have records identifying the attendees. 
Finally we have been waiting for months for your client to produce the financial 
records supporting his economic loss claims. I am surprised that you are only now 
attempting to determine whether Dr. Ereren has documents responsive to requests for 
production to which you have already given written responses. This causes me to question 
whether any good faith effort was made to answer any of defendants3 requests. Given your 
failure to produce these documents, as most recently requested in my letter of October 26, 
2000, we will proceed now to file a motion to compel. 
Very truly yours, 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
KMF/mcw 
cc: Bob Black 
Judy Murray 
80549 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678 
RT M. FRANKENBURG 
November 15, 2000 
Peter C. Collins, Esq. 
BUDGEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Re: Ever en v. Snowbird Corporation 
Our File No.: 1212.0016 
Dear Pete: 
As you have requested, I am providing you with the information Snowbird has 
regarding associations which held meetings at the resort in March 1995. All the 
information we have is included on the attached listing. 
Also enclosed are copies of the surveillance video and photographs which you have 
requested. 
Very truly yours, 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
KMF/mep 
cc: Bob Black 
Judy Murray 
84251 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678 
FAX (801) 364-4500 
E-MAIL kfrankenburg@wilhunt.com 
Snoubird Corporation 
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Todfl J. Ness 
Toi Sehild 
















































SNOUBIRO SKI SCHOOL/UONEN'S UO 
T-3M3 
NERCK t CO. INC. 
IE-079 
UINOHAN SKI 6R0OP 
T-61M 
UINOHAN SKI CROUP 
T-6118 
SNOUBIRO SKI i SEREIOIPin SEN 
M M 
UINOHAN SKI GROUP 
IE-I33 
FANTASTIC SPORTS TRAVEl 
T-6281 
C0UE6E OF ANERICAN PATHOIOGIS 
A-MS4 




IA SIERRA ACADENY 
T-H32 
DEFINITE - NO FIIEI ASS16NED 
JJO-fl 
ABOVE S BEYOND TRAVEl 
T-6277 












UINOHAN SKI GROUP 
35 C 
UINOHAN SKI GROUP 
• C 




SCHICK INCENTIVE SKI TRIP 
21 C 
INA6E EXCHANGE CONNITTEE HEETIW 
15 C 
















































































Origin of Raster Rooting 
Attendees Account list Rebook? 
Projected Actual Projected 























































































Rooi Rev Revenue 
$2,562.•• S $6,93«.M 
$761.11 $«.•• 
$2,159.M * $7,35«.M 
$6,477.11 $22,151.11 
$61,652.11 i / $91,351.M 
$1,782.11 $1.11 
$3,969.•• ^ / $ 8 , 4 M . « 
$6,678.11 %/ $6,311.•• 
$5,S14.M t / $lS,75t.tt 
M%mM t/ $t,?w.w 
$6,273.l« « / $3«,45«.M 
$35,113.11 $<3,I5I.H 
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Sales Person 
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Todd J. Ness 
lathy OiPietro 



























































UT VALLEY CARDIOLOGY 
U-M26 
YPO - NEU JERSEY 
lE-«76 
NAT'I ISSN OF EDUCATION OFFICE 
A-12K 






6 0 SEARLE 
C-1192 








OTSUKA PHARMACEUTICALS INVESTI6AT0R 
1SI C 




IEEE DATA COMPRESSION 
251 C 
SAIES TRAININ6 SUMMIT 
35 C 
CONVATEC S WINTER HT6 
6 C 
INTERVENTIONAL CARDIOLOGY SYMPOSIUM 
HI C/t 
SKI SCHOOL, SPA, VIOEO, SKI PATROL 
12 OF 
BOARD S INSTITUTE MEETINGS 
175 C/l 
YPO SKI GROUP UINTER RETREAT 
31 C 
PARIANT TECHNOLOGY SPRING NTG 
11 • I 
SNR 6ENESIS KNEE NEETIN6 
71 C 



































































Origin of Naster Rooning 
Attendees Account list Rebook? 
Projected Actual Projected 






















































































Rooi Rev Revenue 





$2,16».M lS $2,126.11 
$12,631.11 |/ $62,8M.M 
$4,138.11 $•.•• 
$17,314.11 $7I,6SMI 
$3,268.M ^ $14,131.11 
$712.11 y $1,413.M 
$11,135.11 $18,841.11 
$7,566.M ^ $14,131.11 
$11111 $•.•• 
$3,977.11 $11,511.11 
Page No. 3 
Snoubird Corporation 










Source Neeting Origin of Naster Rooming 
Code Type Attendees Account list Reboot? 
Total Overall 
Projected Actual Projected Actual Projected Actual Projected 
Roon Night Rood Night Guest Night Guest Night Rooit Rev Rooi Rev Revenue 
Jeff Ohlson 13/31/95 M/I2/95 CEICO - PACIFIC DIVISION 
Jeff Ohlson ES-286 





SI 81 • y 
Jl.M SI.1I7.H * $7,851.11 






4.989 I,MS 7,811 7,333 
1,989 <,M« 7,811 7,333 
$11,512.11 16H.989.M Jl,575,2«.9.M 
fro, u{s° 
S1I.SU.M t t l l , ) « ) . ! • H.S'S.!<?••• 
P«J« H. 4 
000180 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH, SUITE 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678 
)RT M. FRANKENBURG TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678 
FAX (801) 364-4500 
E-MAIL kfrankenburg@wilhunt.com 
November 15, 2000 
Peter C. Collins, Esq. Via Facsimile and U.S. Mail 
BUDGEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Re: Ever en v. Snowbird Corporation 
Our File No.: 1212.0016 
Dear Pete: 
We have received your faxed letter of November 15, 2000. 
The information we have on the associations which met at Snowbird in March, 
1995 has already been placed in the mail to you, pursuant to your last letter request. 
With regard to your request that we reconsider and provide further responses to 
your earlier document requests and interrogatories, we respectfully decline to do so. We 
have considered them, responded reasonably to them with what discoverable information 
we have, and your attempts to compel further, or different responses have been soundly 
rejected by the trial court. You may not like the judge's ruling, but that does not make an 
issue for appeal. 
We are sure that you do consider it important to find ccDr. Scott." Whether your 
client also considers it important is doubtful. Given Dr. Ereren's deposition testimony and 
the information he claimed to have, we find it very interesting that he still has not located 
the alleged <cDr. Scott.33 
Finally, you again ask us to confirm the date of the alleged "accident.33 We have 
provided you with the ski school records. We have told you the date of validity of the ski 
ticket you sent to us. As I stated in my letter of October 25th, we cannot and will not 
confirm the date of an accident or "incident33 which we do not believe ever occurred. 
Peter C. Collins, Esq. - 2 - November 15, 2000 
Your client testified that it happened on March 9, 1995. If his testimony is not sufficient 
for you, this is a case you should not have filed. 
Very truly yours, 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Kurt M. Frankenburg 
KMF/mcw 
cc: Bob Black 
Judy Murray 
80549 
